As Leader of the Equality Party, I welcome the government moving towards removal abortion from criminal law as part of the Crime and Policing Bill.
I also want to address the misinformation being put about by people who claim to be ‘pro-life’ and are actually ‘anti-women’, in particular the claim that such a change would “legalise abortion up to birth.” This is simply not true. What is being proposed is not an expansion of abortion time limits, but a long-overdue reform of outdated and harmful legislation.
To understand why this matters, we must begin with the legal foundation currently governing abortion in England and Wales: the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. This Victorian statute criminalises abortion under sections 58 and 59, making it an offence for a woman to “procure her own miscarriage” or for any person to assist her in doing so (Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss.58–59).
This law was enacted in a time when women had virtually no legal rights. In the mid-19th century, women could not vote (Representation of the People Acts, pre-1918), had extremely limited property rights until reforms such as the Married Women’s Property Acts of 1870 and 1882, and had little or no legal claim to custody of their children. Women were excluded from higher education and most professions, and marital rape was not recognised as a crime until 1991. Domestic violence was widely tolerated in law and practice. In essence, women were treated as dependents, or even property – under the control of men.
Although nearly all other laws reflecting that worldview have been repealed or reformed, the criminal provisions governing abortion remain in force. They are, in effect, a legal relic of a time when women were denied autonomy over their own bodies.
The Abortion Act 1967 did not repeal these provisions. Instead, it created limited exceptions. Under this Act, abortion is lawful only if two registered medical practitioners agree, in good faith, that continuing the pregnancy would pose a greater risk to the physical or mental health of the woman or her existing children than terminating it (Abortion Act 1967, s.1). In other words, abortion is still technically a criminal offence unless it falls within these prescribed exceptions.
This means that, even in early pregnancy, a woman does not have the legal right to simply request and receive an abortion. Instead, she must meet criteria assessed by doctors. While in practice access is often granted, the underlying legal framework remains rooted in criminalisation.
For years, medical professionals-including the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) and the British Medical Association (BMA)-as well as legal experts have argued that this framework is outdated and unsafe. They have consistently maintained that pregnancy and abortion are matters of healthcare, not criminal law. Criminalisation introduces fear, stigma, and, in some cases, real harm.
We have already seen troubling consequences. There have been cases in which vulnerable women experiencing late miscarriages or stillbirths have been investigated, arrested, or prosecuted under the 1861 Act. These are women in medical distress, who should be receiving care and compassion, not suspicion and criminal sanction. The existence of these laws creates a climate in which healthcare can become entangled with policing, to the detriment of patient safety.
The proposed reform-to remove abortion from criminal law-does not change the legal time limits for abortion. The current framework, which generally permits abortion up to 24 weeks under specific conditions, would remain in place (Abortion Act 1967, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990). What would change is how the law treats those involved.
If an abortion were carried out outside the legal framework – for example, beyond the time limit without lawful justification-it would not become “legal.” Instead, it would be treated as a matter of medical regulation and professional accountability. Doctors responsible for unlawful or negligent care could face serious consequences, including being struck off by the General Medical Council, just as they would for any other form of malpractice.
This is an important distinction. Decriminalisation does not mean deregulation. It means shifting oversight from the criminal courts to the appropriate medical and regulatory bodies.
Some critics raise concerns about the possibility of women misleading doctors-for example, by concealing how far along a pregnancy is in order to obtain abortion pills. But this argument overlooks both medical reality and existing law. If abortion medication were taken at a late stage, such as 30 weeks, it would likely induce labour, resulting in the birth of a live infant. Any subsequent intentional harm to that infant would already constitute a serious criminal offence, including murder or infanticide under existing law (Infanticide Act 1938; common law offences).
There is no legal vacuum here. The law already provides robust protection against harm to born children.
What, then, is the purpose of decriminalisation? It is, fundamentally, a matter of legal coherence, medical safety, and human dignity. It is about removing the last vestige of a Victorian legal framework that treated women as lacking autonomy and agency. It is about recognising that women are full human beings, entitled to make decisions about their own bodies, and to receive healthcare without fear of criminalisation.
This reform is, in many ways, a “tidying up” exercise-bringing the law into alignment with modern values and medical practice. It does not introduce new rights to late-term abortion. It does not weaken safeguards. It simply removes an archaic criminal underpinning that serves no constructive purpose and can, in fact, cause harm.
Even those who hold differing views on abortion should be able to agree on this point: a law from 1861, rooted in a time of profound gender inequality, is not an appropriate foundation for regulating modern healthcare. If we believe in fairness, in evidence-based policy, and in the equal dignity of all people, then the continued use of the Offences Against the Person Act in this context is indefensible.
Decriminalising abortion is not about extremism. It is about modernisation. It is about ensuring that women are treated not as subjects of suspicion, but as patients deserving care. And it is about finally removing from our statute book one of the last remaining legal expressions of a time when women had no rights at all.
Kay Wesley
Equality Party Leader
20th March 2026
References
- Offences Against the Person Act 1861, sections 58–59.
- Abortion Act 1967, section 1.
- Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (amending the Abortion Act 1967).
- Representation of the People Act 1918 (context: women’s suffrage).
- Married Women’s Property Acts 1870 and 1882.
- Custody of Infants Act 1839.
- R v R [1991] UKHL 12 (marital rape criminalised).
- Infanticide Act 1938.
- Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) policy statements on decriminalisation of abortion.
- British Medical Association (BMA) policy on abortion law reform.
The Equality Party 